Wednesday, January 23, 2019

Prototype

Prototype Theory Rosch (1976) has pro constitute an alternative to the view that conceptions are composed from sets of features which necessarily and sufficiently define instances of a concept. Rosch proposes that concepts are best viewed as mental images a damn is not best defined by prolongation to a set of features that refer to such matters as wings, warm-bloodedness, and egg-laying characteristics, but kinda by propagation to regular(prenominal) instances, so that a proto natural bird is something more like a robin than it is like a toucan, penguin, ostrich, or even eagle.This is the speculation of prototypes. As we saw in the preceding section, individuals do have ideas of usual instances of colors, and these ideas are remarkably similar among various cultural groups. such(prenominal) similarity in views, however, is found not only in reference to birds and colors.A variety of experiments has shown that throng do in fact classify kind of consistently objects of vari ous kinds according to what they regard as beingness typical instances for example, (1) furniture, so that, whereas a chair is a typical item of furniture, an ashtray is not (2) fruit, so that, whereas apples and plums are typical, coconuts and olives are not and (3) clothing, so that, whereas coats and tro functionrs are typical items, things like bracelets and purses are not (Clark and Clark, 1977, p. 64). The remarkably uniform behavior that people exhibit in such tasks cannot be accounted for by a theory which says that concepts are formed from sets of be features. Such a theory fails to formulate why some instances are consistently held to be more typical or central than others when all exhibit the selfsame(prenominal) set of defining features. Hudson (1996, pp. 75-8) believes that prototype theory has such(prenominal) to offer sociolinguists.He believes it leads to an easier account of how people nab to use language, particularly linguistic concepts, from the kinds of in stances they come across. He says (p. 77) that a prototype-based concept can be learned on the basis of a genuinely small number of instances perhaps a single one and with pop out whatsoever kind of formal definition, whereas a feature-based definition would be very much harder to learn since a much larger number of cases, plus a number of non-cases, would be needed before the learner could work out which features were necessary nd which were not. Moreover, such a view allows for a more flexible approach to understanding how people actually use language. In that usage certain concepts are necessarily fuzzy, as the theory predicts they get out be, but that very fuzziness allows speakers to use language creatively. According to Hudson, prototype theory may even be applied to the neighborly situations in which speech occurs.He suggests that, when we hear a new linguistic item, we associate with it who typically seems to use it and what, apparently, is the typical occasion of its us e. Again, we need very few instances &8212 even perhaps just a single one &8212 to be able to do this. Of course, if the particular instance is atypical and we fail to recognize this fact, we could be in for some discomfort at a later time when we sue it as typical. Prototype theory, then, offers us a possible way of looking not only at how concepts may be formed, i. . , at the cognitive dimensions of linguistic behavior but also at how we achieve our social competence in the use of language. We judge circumstances as being typically this or typically that, and we place people in the same way. We then tailor our language to fit, making it appropriate to the situation and the participants as we view these. (Wardhaugh, Ronald. 1998. An Introduction to Sociolinguistics. 3rd ed. Blackwell Publishers Ltd. pp. 232-233. )

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